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Abstract
We revisit the analysis of subscription equilibria in a full fledged gen-
eral equilibrium model with public goods. We study the case of a non-
profit, or public, firm that produces the public good using private goods as
inputs, which are to be financed by voluntary contributions (subscriptions)
of households. We prove existence and generic regularity of subscription
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we prove the existence and generic regularity of subscription equi-
libria in a pure public good economy where the public good is produced by a
non-profit, or public, firm.
In a series of path-breaking articles that have set forth a definitive theory
of public goods, Samuelson (1954, 1969) presented the first modern analyses
of public goods within a general equilibrium context. His main concern being
the normative one, Samuelson provided a characterization of welfare optima
in public good economies, but he did not elaborate on the process through
which the level of a public good is to be determined. For a positive theory of
equilibrium, one has to specify how the level of a public good is to be determined,
and, owing to the distinctive nature of public goods, this is typically going to be
a collective (political) decision-making process that goes beyond the standard
pure market equilibrium notion.
Starting with Foley (1967), there have been various attempts to provide the-
ories of politico-economic equilibrium with public goods in a general equilibrium
context. The problem from the view point of economic theory, however, is the
fact that one has to provide precise institutional details of how such collective
decisions are to be made, an area of inquiry that perhaps intersects more with
political science than standard economic theory.
To provide an analysis of the public good problem from pure economic the-
ory point of view, as well as to serve as a benchmark extension of an analysis
of completely decentralized private good economies to public good economies,
a useful starting point is to study which equilibria will be established in the
absence of a central authority or mutual agreement among the agents. Towards
this end, within a general equilibrium context Malinvaud (1972, p. 213) pro-
posed to study the system whereby the public good is financed by subscription,
with each household making a contribution to increase the production of public
good. The contributions are to be voluntary and contribution decisions are to
be made by each household independently of other households, the complete
autonomy of households thus being fully respected.
Many studies have investigated properties of subscription equilibria with
voluntary contributions.1 However, most of them adopt what is essentially a
partial equilibrium framework. In a model which is now the canonical reference
in the voluntary contribution literature, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)
assume the presence of only one private good, and of a linear production tech-
nology for a single public good. With these assumptions there is no need to
model production explicitly, since, up to a rescaling of the unit of measure, one
unit of the private good is transformed into one unit of the public good. This,
in turn, implies that there will be no (relative) prices to be determined and
that profit maximizing firms will have zero profits in a competitive equilibrium.
Thus, the model can be reduced to a simple game in which each player has one
1See Myles (1995), pp. 279-290, for a review of the applications of the concept to questions
in public economics.
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variable to choose (the amount of private contribution) in the closed interval
whose endpoints are zero and the endowment of the private good.
The large literature that follows Bergstrom et al. (1986) mainly focuses on
questions other than existence of equilibria, such as neutrality of equilibrium
outcomes with respect to redistribution of income. Papers on existence are
limited to the case of one public good, one private good - see Cornes, Hartley
and Sandler (1999) and papers quoted there. The only exception is a companion
paper, Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005), where we show existence in a model
with many private goods and where the public good is produced through a
non-linear production technology by competitive firms.
When more than one private good and a non-linear production technology
are allowed, modeling of how and by whom the public good is produced becomes
a crucial preliminary issue to be resolved. If a profit-maximizing (private) firm
is assumed to produce the public good under a non-constant returns to scale
technology, then how the (non-zero) profits of the firm are apportioned among
its shareholders will have an impact on equilibrium outcomes. An alternative
is to consider the production of the public good as being carried out by a non-
profit, or a public firm subject to a balanced budget constraint.
In the present paper, we study a model with many private goods where a
public good is produced through a non-linear production technology by a non-
profit, or public, firm subject to a balanced budget constraint. The amount of
public good to be produced by the non-profit firm is taken as the maximum
amount that can be produced with the amount of subscriptions collected from
consumers. Observe that this is in line with the one private good and linear
production technology model by Bergstrom et al. (1986), with the firm(s)having
no profits motive, and using eﬃciently the available technology, which allows to
transform one unit of private good in one unit of public good.
As for the behavior of households, each household starts with endowments
in private good only. There is no public good initially. For given private good
prices, initial endowments of private goods, as well as other households’ choices
of subscriptions, each household chooses a vector of private good consumption
levels and a subscription level (in the amount of the numeraire good) so as to
maximize utility.
Note that in choosing their subscription levels the households will take into
consideration relative prices. Observe that household behavior described above
amounts to assuming that the prices of private goods are taken as given by
households in their maximization problem, while there is strategic interaction
among them regarding the subscription levels chosen. This type of behavior is
plausible when the set of prospective consumers of the public good are ‘small’
with respect to the economy in which they are embedded. For example, consider
donations to a large agency that is involved in projects to eradicate poverty in
Africa. Eradication of poverty in Africa is the public good for those who care
about it in this case, and their contributions (amounts they subscribe) to the
agency are not going to aﬀect the prices of goods that go into the activities of
the agency.
We provide a proof of existence in this model using a homotopy argument.
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In addition to proving existence, we also show generic regularity of equilibria.
Regularity is an indispensable tool for carrying out comparative statics analyses.
We show that for any vector of utility and production functions, in an open and
full measure subset of the endowments, there is a finite number of equilibria
and a local smooth dependence of the equilibrium variables on the exogenous
variables.
Section 2 presents the setup of the model. In Section 3 the existence of equi-
librium is proved using an homotopy argument. Section 4 contains the proof of
generic regularity of the equilibria. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Set-up of the Model
We consider a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public good.
There are C, C ≥ 1, private commodities, labelled by c = 1, 2, ..., C. There are
H households, H > 1, labelled by h = 1, 2, ...,H. Let H = {1, ...,H} denote
the set of households. Let xch denote consumption of private commodity c by
household h; ech embodies similar notation for the endowment in private goods.
The following standard notation is also used:
• xh ≡ (xch)Cc=1, x ≡ (xh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ .
• eh ≡ (ech)Cc=1, e ≡ (eh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ .
• pc is the price of private good c, with p ≡ (pc)Cc=1. Prices are expressed in
units of the numeraire good C, whose price is therefore normalized to 1.
Define p\ ≡ (pc)C−1c=1 and p ≡
¡
p\, 1
¢
.
• gh ∈ R+ is the amount of resources (measured in units of the numeraire
good) that consumer h provides. Let g ≡ (gh)Hh=1, G ≡
PH
h=1 gh, and
G\h ≡ G− gh.
• yg is the amount of public good produced in the economy.
The preferences over the private goods and the public good of household h
are represented by a utility function
uh : RC++ ×R++ → R, uh : (xh, yg) 7→ uh (xh, yg)
Assumption 1 uh(xh, yg) is a smooth, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing (i.e.,
for every (xh, yg) ∈ RC+1++ , Duh(xh, yg)À 0)2 , diﬀerentiably strictly qua-
siconcave function (i.e.,∀(xh, yg) ∈ RC+1++ ,∀v ∈ RC+1\ {0}, if Duh (xh, yg) v =
0, then vD2uh (xh, yg) v < 0) and for each u ∈ R, the set
©
(xh, yg) ∈ RC+1++ : uh (xh, yg) ≥ u
ª
is closed (in the standard topology of RC+1).
2For vectors y, z, y ≥ z (resp. y À z) means every element of y is not smaller (resp.
strictly larger) than the correponding element of z; y > z means that y ≥ z but y 6= z.
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Let U be the set of utility functions uh satisfying Assumption 1.
The production technology available to produce the public good is described
by the following production function.
f : RC++ → R++, f : y 7−→ f (y)
Assumption 2 f is C2, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing, diﬀerentiably strictly
concave (i.e., ∀y ∈ RC++, D2f is negative definite), and ∀f ∈ R++,
clRC{y ∈ RC++ : f(y) ≥ f} ⊆ RC++.
Let F be the set of production functions f satisfying Assumption 2. Note
that Assumption 2 rules out constant returns to scale and increasing returns to
scale production functions.3
The government collects resources from the contributors, and maximizes the
production of public goods, given the constraint to balance the budget, i.e., it
solves the following problem. For given p\ ∈ RC−1++ and G ∈ R++,
maxy∈RC++ f (y) s.t −py +G = 0 (α) (1)
with G =
P
h gh and where we follow the convention of writing associated
Lagrange or Kuhn-Tucker multipliers next to the constraint.
For given p\ ∈ RC−1++ and G ∈ R++ a solution to problem (1) is characterized
by Lagrange conditions.
Define bf : RC−1++ ×R++ → R++, ¡p\,G¢ 7→ max (1)
Remark 1 As an application of the envelope and the implicit function theo-
rems, we have that ∀
¡
p\,G
¢
∈ RC++, DG bf ¡p\,G¢ = α > 0 and DGG bf ¡p\, G¢ =³
p
¡
D2f
¡
y
¡
p\, G
¢¢¢−1
p
´−1
< 0, where y
¡
p\,G
¢
= argmax(1).
Household’s problem is the following one. For given p\ ∈ RC−1++ , G\h ∈
R+, eh ∈ RC++,
max(xh,gh)∈RC++×R uh
³
xh, bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢´ s.t. −pxh + peh − gh = 0
gh ≥ 0
Equivalently, we can write the household’s problem as follows. For given p\ ∈
RC−1++ , G\h ∈ R+, eh ∈ RC++,
max(xh,gh,ygh)∈RC++×R++ uh (xh, y
g
h) s.t. −pxh + peh − gh ≥ 0 λh
gh ≥ 0 µh
−ygh + bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ ≥ 0 ηh
(2)
3The analysis of linear, constant and increasing returns to scale production technologies
are surely important, in general, and in the case of public good production, in particular. On
the other hand, they lead to multiple solutions and/or severe discontinuities in the firm supply
map, preventing the use of the smooth approach we adopt in this paper.
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Observe that in the latter formulation, in equilibrium it must be the case that
for every h, ygh = y
g.
Remark 2 For given p\ ∈ RC−1++ , G\h ∈ R+, eh ∈ RC++, a solution to problem
(2) is characterized by Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Definition 3 An economy is an element π ≡ (e, u, f) in Π ≡ RCH++ × UH ×F .
Definition 4 A vector (y, x, yg, g, p\) is an equilibrium for an economy π ∈ Π
if:
1. the public firm maximizes, i.e., it solves problem (1) at
³
p,
PH
h=1 gh
´
;
2. households maximize, i.e., for each h , (xh, y
g
h, gh) solves problem (2) at
p\ ∈ RC−1++ ,
P
h0 6=h gh ∈ R+, eh ∈ RC++; and
3. markets clear , i.e., (x, y) solves
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y\ +
PH
h=1 e
\
h = 0
where for each h, x\h ≡ (xch)c6=C , e
\
h ≡ (ech)c6=C ∈ R
C−1
++ and y
\ ≡
(yc)c6=C ∈ RC−1.4
In the remainder of the paper we are going to use several equivalent equi-
librium systems. System (3) below simply lists Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the
agent’s maximization problems and market clearing conditions. System (5) is
used to prove existence and it is the closest one to the fictitious economy used to
construct the needed homotopy. System (13) is used to show generic regularity.
Define
Ξ0 ≡ RC++×R++×R++×
¡
RC++ ×R++ ×R++ ×R++ ×R
¢H×{g ∈ RH : ΣHh=1gh > 0}×RC−1++
ξ0 ≡
³
y, α, yg, (xh, y
g
h, λh, ηh, µh)
H
h=1 , g, p
\
´
and
F1 : Ξ0 ×RCH++ → RdimΞ
0
, F1 :
¡
ξ0, π
¢ 7→ left hand side of (3) below
4Clearly, the Walras’ law applies in this model.
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(1) Df (y)− αp = 0
(2) −py +
P
h gh = 0
(3) yg − f (y) = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g
h)− λhp = 0
(h.2) Dyguh (xh, y
g
h)− ηh = 0
(h.3) −λh + µh + ηhDG bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ = 0
(h.4) −pxh + peh − gh = 0
(h.5) −ygh + bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ = 0
(h.6) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M) −
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y\ +
PH
h=1 e
\
h = 0
(3)
Note that in the above system we in fact have
yg = f (y) = bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ = ygh for all h (4)
where we used the definition of bf and equations (1) and (2) in the above system.
Observe that (y, x, yg, g, p\) is an equilibrium associated with an economy π if
and only if there exists (α, λ, η, µ) such that F1
³
y, α, yg, (xh, y
g
h, λh, ηh, µh)
H
h=1 , g, p
\, π
´
=
0. With innocuous abuse of terminology, we will call ξ0an equilibrium.
3 Existence of equilibria
To show existence we consider an arbitrary (u, f) ∈ U × F , which remains fixed
throughout the analysis. Hence the relevant exogenous variable space is the
endowment space RCH++ .
We first define a new equilibrium system which is equivalent to system (3)
above5.
(fh.1) Df (yh)− αhp = 0
(fh.2) −pyh + gh +G\h = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g
h)− λhp = 0
(h.2) Dyguh (xh, y
g
h)− ηh = 0
(h.3) −λh + µh + ηhαh = 0
(h.4) −pxh + peh − gh = 0
(h.5) −ygh + bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ = 0
(h.6) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M) −
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y
\
1 +
PH
h=1 e
\
h = 0
(5)
Define
Ξ ≡
¡
RC++ ×R++×R++ ×RC++ ×R++ ×R++ ×R++ ×R
¢H×{g ∈ RH : ΣHh=1gh > 0}×RC−1++
5The diﬀerences between the two systems are the following: We identified y with y1and
α with α1; we introduced the new variables (yh, αh)h6=1; we basically repeated H times the
first two equations.
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ξ ≡
³
(yh, αh, y
g
h, xh, y
g
h, λh, ηh, µh)
H
h=1 , g, p
\
´
and
F : Ξ×RCH++ → RdimΞ, F : (ξ, e) 7→ left hand side of (5) below
If F (ξ, e) = 0, we still call ξ an equilibrium associated with e. We now want
to apply the following theorem to prove existence of equilibria.6
Theorem 5 Let M and N be two C2 boundaryless manifolds of the same di-
mension, y ∈ N and f, g : M → N be such that f is C0 and g is C0 and
C1in an open neighborhood of g−1 (y), y is a regular value for g, #g−1 (y) is
odd, there exists a continuous homotopy H from f to g such that H−1 (y) is
compact. Then f−1 (y) 6= ∅.
In the remaining part of the present section we verify the assumptions of
Theorem 5. The basic idea of the proof is as follows. Construct a model where
every households produces her own amount of the public good “at home” using
the available technology f (and household 1 is treated in a slightly asymmetric
way). Equilibria in that model are zeros of the function g mentioned in the above
theorem. Then, find an homotopy which “links” those fictitious equilibria with
the “true” ones, which are zeros of the function f .
The first step toward the construction of the homotopy is to construct a
so-called test economy.
Definition 6 An allocation (x, yg, y) ∈ RCH++ × RH++ × RCH++ is feasible at total
resources r ∈ RC++ for an economy where good g can only be “privately home
produced” if
−
PH
h=1 (xh − yh) + r ≥ 0
−ygh + f (yh) ≥ 0 for each h ∈ H
A feasible allocation (x, yg, y) is Pareto optimal in the model where the pub-
lic good is “privately home produced”, if there is no other feasible allocation³
x0, yg
0
, y0
´
such that
³
uh
³
x0h, y
g0
h
´´H
h=1
> (uh (xh, y
g
h))
H
h=1.
We will refer to Pareto optimal allocations presented in Definition 6 simply
as Pareto optimal allocations. Define
Ur ≡ {(uh)Hh=1 ∈ RH : there exists a feasible allocation (x, ygh) at r
such that for each h, uh (xh, y
g
h)− uh = 0}
and
Ur\1 ≡ {(uh)h6=1 ∈ RH−1 : there exists u1 ∈ R such that
³
u1, (uh)h6=1
´
∈ Ur}
6The theorem is a well-known result in degree thoery; for a self-contained proof, see, for
example, Villanacci and others (2002), Chapter 7.
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Given our smooth and strictly concave framework, we can easily characterize
Pareto optimal allocations in terms of the solutions to the following maximiza-
tion problem. For given
³
r, u\1
´
∈ RC++ × Ur\1,
Max
(x,yg,y)∈RCH++×RH++×RCH++
u1 (x1, y
g
1)
s.t
(1) uh (xh, y
g
h)− uh ≥ 0 ∀h 6= 1
(2) −ygh + f (yh) ≥ 0 ∀ h ∈ H
(3) −
PH
h=1 (xh + yh) + r ≥ 0
(6)
The following lemmas are standard results in general equilibrium theory.
Define θ1 ≡ 1.
Lemma 7 There exists a unique solution (x∗, yg∗, y∗) to problem (6) at
³
r, u\1
´
,
and it is Pareto optimal. Moreover, there exists (θ∗, γg∗, γ∗) such that
(x∗, yg∗, y∗, θ∗, γg∗, γ∗)
is the unique solution to the system of first order conditions for that problem,
i.e., to the system below:
(h.1) θhDxhuh (xh, y
g
h)− γ = 0
(h.2) θhDyghuh (xh, y
g
h)− γ
g
h = 0
(fh.1) γghDf (yh)− γ = 0
(5) (uh (xh, y
g
h)− uh)h6=1 = 0
(6) −ygh + f (yh) = 0
(7) −
PH
h=1 (xh + yh) + r = 0
(x∗, yg∗, y∗, θ∗, γg∗, γ∗) is also the unique solution for the first order condi-
tions to problem (6) atÃ
HX
h=1
(x∗h + y
∗
h) ,
¡
uh
¡
x∗h, y
g∗
h
¢¢
h6=1
!
(7)
For each e ∈ RCH++ , and associated (x∗, y∗) described in Lemma 7, define
H : Ξ× [0, 1]→ RdimΞ,
H : (ξ, τ) 7→ left hand side of system (8)
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(fh.1) Df (yh)− αhp = 0
(fh.2) −pyh + gh + (1− τ)G\h = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g
h)− λhp = 0
(h.2) Dyguh (xh, y
g
h)− ηh = 0
(h.3) −λh + µh + ηhDG bf ¡p, gh + (1− τ)G\h¢ = 0
(1.4) −px1 + p [(1− τ) e1 + τ (x∗1 + y∗1)]− g1
(h.4) , h 6= 1 −pxh + p [(1− τ) eh + τ (x∗h + y∗h)]− gh − τ (1− τ)G\h = 0
(h.5) −ygh + bf ¡p, gh + (1− τ)G\h¢ = 0
(h.6) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M)
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y
\
1 − τ
P
h6=1 y
\
h+h
(1− τ)
PH
h=1 e
\
h + τ
PH
h=1
³
x∗\h + y
∗\
h
´i = 0
(8)
Remark 8 Walras law holds for the above system and therefore the “missing”
C − th equation in (M) is indeed satisfied.
Define G (ξ) ≡ H (ξ, 1). Observe that at τ = 0, we get the equilibrium
system (5). At τ = 1, we get
(fh.1) Df (yh)− αhp = 0
(fh.2) −pyh + gh = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g
h)− λhp = 0
(h.2) Dyguh (xh, y
g
h)− ηh = 0
(h.3) −λh + µh + ηhαh = 0
(h.4) −pxh + px∗h − gh + py∗h = 0
(h.5) −ygh + bf (p, gh) = 0
(h.6) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M) −
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y
\
1 −
P
h6=1 yh +
PH
h=1 (x
∗
h + y
∗
h) = 0
(9)
Lemma 9 There exists ξ∗∗ such that G (ξ∗∗) = 0.
Proof. It is enough to take the diﬀerent subvectors of ξ∗∗ as described
below.
y∗∗h = y
∗
h, α
∗∗
h =
γC∗
γg∗h
, x∗∗h = x
∗
h, y
g∗∗
h = y
g∗
h , λ
∗∗
h =
γC∗
θ∗h
,
η∗∗h =
γg∗h
θ∗h
, µ∗∗h = 0, g
∗∗
h = p
∗∗y∗h, p
∗∗ = γ
∗
γC∗
Lemma 10 {ξ∗∗} = G−1 (0) .
Proof. Suppose there exists bξ ≡ ³by, byg, bα, bx, bg, bµ, bλ, bp\´ ∈ G−1 (0), withbξ 6= ξ∗∗. Observe that (bx, by) = (x∗, y∗). Otherwise,
(x00, yg00, y00) ≡ 1
2
(bx, byg, by) + 1
2
(x∗, yg∗, y∗) (10)
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would be feasible and Pareto superior to (x∗, yg∗, y∗), contradicting Lemma 7.
The proof of that results uses the strict quasiconcavity of uh and the strict
concavity of f . Then, from (f.h.1) , (f.h.2) and (h.5)in system (9), and the
definition of yg∗, we have also that byg = yg∗. The other equalities follow easily
from system (9).
Lemma 11 DξG (ξ∗∗) has full rank.
Proof. DξG (ξ∗∗) is displayed below.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
D2hf −pT −αhI0
−p 1 −y\Th
D2xhxh D
2
xhy
g
h
;pT −λhI
0
D2
xhy
g
h
D2
yghy
g
h
−1
ηh −1 αh 1
−p −1 y\Th
−1 αh −αhy\h
1
−I0 −I0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
In fact, it has full rank if the following matrix M does.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
D2hf −pT −αhI0
−p 1
D2xhxh D
2
xhy
g
h
−pT −λhI
0
D2
xhy
g
h
D2
yghy
g
h
−1
ηh −1 αh
−p −1
−1 αh
−I0 −I0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
We are going to show that kerM = {0}. Defining M∆ = 0 with
∆ ≡
³
(∆yh,∆αh,∆xh,∆y
g
h,∆gh,∆λh,∆ηh)
H
h=1 ,∆p
\
´
, M∆ = 0 is dis-
played below.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
D2hf∆yh − pT∆αh +
∙
−αhI
0
¸
∆p\ = 0
−p∆yh +∆gh = 0
D2xhxh∆xh +D
2
xhy
g
h
∆ygh − pT∆λh
∙
−λhI
0
¸
∆p\ = 0
D2xhygh
∆xh +D2yghy
g
h
∆ygh −∆ηh = 0
ηh∆αh −∆λh + αh∆ηh = 0
−p∆xh −∆gh = 0
−∆ygh + αh∆gh = 0
[−I0]
P
h (∆yh +∆xh) = 0
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The proof proceeds through the following steps.
a. ∃h such that (∆xh,∆ygh,∆yh) 6= 0; b. Duh (xh, ygh)
µ
∆xh
∆ygh
¶
= 0; c.P
h∆yh
D2f(yh)
αh
∆yh +
P
h (∆xh,∆y
g
h)
D2uh(xh,ygh)
λh
(∆xh,∆y
g
h) = 0.
From a., we are left with considering two cases. Case 1.: ∃h such that
(∆xh,∆y
g
h) 6= 0; and Case 2.: ∃h such that ∆yh 6= 0. In both cases, given
that uh is (diﬀerentiably) strictly quasiconcave, and f is diﬀerentiably strictly
concave, we have a. and b. contradict c.
Lemma 12 H−1 (0) is compact.
Proof. Taken an arbitrary sequence (ξv, τv)v∈N inH
−1 (0), we want to show
that, up to a subsequence, it does converge to
¡
ξ, τ
¢
∈ H−1 (0).
Preliminary Remark: As verified below, ∀h,
©
(xvh, y
gv
h )h : v ∈ N
ª
is con-
tained in a closed (in the topology of RC) subset of RC+1++ .
Equations (1.1) − (1.6) in system (9) are Kuhn-Tucker system associated
with the problem
max(x1,g1,yg1)∈RC++×R u1 (x1, y
g
1) s.t. −px1 + p [(1− τ) e1 + τ (x∗1 + y∗1)]− g1 = 0 λ1
g1 ≥ 0 µ1
−yg1 + bf ¡p, g1 + (1− τ)G\1¢ ≥ 0 η1
Equations (h.1) − (h.6) are the Kuhn-Tucker system of equations associated
with the problem
max(xh,gh,ygh)∈RC++×R×R++ uh (xh, y
g
h) s.t.
−pxh + p [(1− τ) eh + τ (x∗h + y∗h)]+
−gh − τ (1− τ)G\h = 0
λh
gh ≥ 0 µh
−ygh + bf ¡p, gh + (1− τ)G\h¢ ≥ 0 ηh
Observe that ∀h
exh = ex ≡ 1
3H
µ
min
h∈H
{(1− τ) ech + τ (x∗ch + y∗ch )}
¶C
c=1
> 0
egh = eg ≡ pex > 0
eygh = eyg ≡ bf
⎛
⎝p, egh + (1− τ)X
h0 6=h
egh0
⎞
⎠ ≥ bf (p, egh) = f (ex) > 0
belongs to the constraint set of household h for each value of eh ∈ RC++ and
τ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore ∀v
uh (xvh, y
gv
h ) ≥ uh (ex, f (ex))
and, from Assumption 1, we get the desired result.
Since {τv : v ∈ N} ⊆ [0, 1], up to a subsequence, (τn)n∈N converges, say, to
τ . We distinguish two cases: Case 1. τ = 0, and Case 2. τ ∈ (0, 1].
12
Case 1. τ = 0.
x1, y1, y
g
1
{(xv, yv1) : v ∈ N} is bounded below by zero and, by Walras law, it is bounded
above by total resources. From the Preliminary Remark above, { (xv1, ygv1 ) : v ∈ N}
is contained in a closed subset of RC+1++ . Therefore (xv1, y
gv
1 )v converges to an
element (x1, y
g
1) belonging to R
C+1
++ . Moreover, from (f.1.1) , (f.1.2) and (1.5)
in system (5),
ygv1 = f (y
v
1)
and therefore { ygv1 : v ∈ N} is bounded above, because { yv1 : v ∈ N} is bounded
above. Take y
g
1 = min {ygv1 : n ∈ N} ∪ {yg1}. Then ∀v, ygv1 ≥ yg1. On the other
hand,
{yv1 : v ∈ N} ⊆
©
y01 ∈ RC++ : f (y0h) ≥ y
g
1
ª
otherwise ∃v such that
f
¡
yv1
¢
< y
g
1
but
∀v, yg1 ≤ y
gv
1 = f (y
v
1)
a contradiction.
Therefore, yv1 is bounded above and below and it is contained in closed set
of RC++ and therefore converges.
λ1, p, η1, α1, µ1, g1
(λv1, p
v) , ηv1, α
v
1, µ
v
1, g
v
1 converge from (1.1) , (1.2), (f.1.1), (1.3), and (1.4) in
system (5), respectively.
(ygh)h6=1
From (fh.1) , (fh.2) and (h.5), f (yvh) = y
gv
h = y
gv
1 and therefore (y
gv
h )h6=1
converges.
(xh)h6=1
Using market clearing, i.e., (M) and Walras’law, for xh and the above fact
for (ygh)h6=1 ,we have that (x
v
h, y
gv
h ) is bounded above. It is bounded below by
assumption, and from the Preliminary Remark it is contained in a closed subset
of R(C+1)(H−1)++ .
(gh)h6=1
From (h.4) for each h,we get
Av (gvh)
H
h=1 = (γ
v
h)
H
h=1 (11)
where
A ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
δ 1 ... δ
... ... ... ...
δ δ ... 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
and δ ≡ τ (1− τ).
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Taking limits for v →∞ of both sides of (11), we have that the right hand
side does converge say to γ because of previous steps, and we have
I
³
lim
v→∞
gvh
´H
h=1
= γ
as desired.
(yh)h6=1
By assumption { yvh : v ∈ N}is bounded below. It is bounded above, other-
wise (f.h.2) would be violated. Following the same argument presented above
for the convergence of yv1 we can show that{yvh : n ∈ N} is contained in a closed
subset of RC++.
(λh, ηh, αh, µh)h6=1
The argument is the same as that one used to show convergence of the
corresponding variables for household 1.
Case 2. τ ∈ (0, 1] .
(xh, yh, y
g
h)h
Observe that {(xv, yv) : v ∈ N} is bounded below by zero and, since Walras
law for the homotopy does hold, it is bounded above by total resources, as
illustrated below. ∀ v
yv1 ≤
"
(1− τv)
HX
h=1
e\h + τ
v
HX
h=1
³
x∗\h + y
∗\
h
´#
−
HX
h=1
xv\h − τv
X
h6=1
yv\h
Since τv → τ > 0, for v suﬃciently large τv > 0. Take τ = min {τv : v ∈ N}∪
{τ}. For h 6= 1, ∀v
yvh ≤ 1τv
³
−
PH
h=1 x
v\
h − y
v\
1 − τ
P
h0 6=1,h y
v\
h0 +
h
(1− τv)
PH
h=1 e
\
h + τ
vPH
h=1
³
x∗\h + y
∗\
h
´i´
≤
1
τ
hPH
h=1 e
\
h +
PH
h=1
³
x∗\h + y
∗\
h
´i
Moreover, ∀h, v
xvh ≤ (1− τv)
HX
h=1
e\h + τ
v
HX
h=1
³
x∗\h + y
∗\
h
´
From (f.h.1) , (f.h.2) and (h.5),
ygvh = f (y
v
h)
and therefore ygvh is bounded above, because y
v
h is bounded above.
Summarizing, (xvh, y
gv
h ) is bounded above and below, and, from the Pre-
liminary Remark, it is contained in closed set contained in RC+1++ . Therefore
it converges to an element (xh, y
g
h) belonging to R
C+1
++ . Convergence of y
v
h is
shown using the same argument used for the convergence of yv1 in Case 1 above.
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Therefore,
©
(xh, yh, y
g
h)
vª is contained in a compact subset of R2C+1++ , and
thus it converges.
(λh, ηh, αh, µh)h , p
The argument is the same as in Case 1.
(gh)h
From (f.h.2) we have
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 (1− τv) ... (1− τv)
(1− τv) 1 ... (1− τv)
... ... ... ...
(1− τv) (1− τv) ... 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
gv1
gv2
...
gvH
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
pvyv1
pvyv2
...
pvyvH
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Taking limits of both sides, it follows that it suﬃces to show that the following
matrix has full rank.
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 (1− τ) ... (1− τ)
(1− τ) 1 ... (1− τ)
... ... ... ...
(1− τ) (1− τ) ... 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
That is the case iﬀ τ 6= 0, which we assumed, and if 1− (H − 1) τ +H − 1 6= 0,
which is certainly true.
The previous results lead to the main result of the section.
Theorem 13 For every economy π ∈ Π, an equilibrium exists.
4 Regularity
Lemma 14 For every e ∈ RCH++ , ξ0 is a solution to system (3) if and only if it
is a solution to the following system
(1) Df (y)− αp = 0
(2) −py +
P
h gh = 0
(3) yg − f (y) = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g)− λhp = 0
(h.30) αDyguh (xh, yg)− λh + µh = 0
(h.4) −pxh + peh − gh = 0
(h.6) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M) −
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y\ +
PH
h=1 e
\
h = 0
(h.50) −ygh + yg = 0
(h.60) αηh − λh + µh = 0
(12)
Proof. The proof follows from the comparison of systems (3) and (12), and
from Remark 1.
Since ηh appears only in equation (h.6
0) and it is uniquely determined by that
equation, and ygh appears only in equation (h.5
0) and it is uniquely determined by
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that equation,we can erase those variables and equations and get the following
basically equivalent system.
(1) Df (y)− αp = 0
(2) −py +
P
h gh = 0
(3) yg − f (y) = 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh, y
g)− λhp = 0
(h.2) αDyguh (xh, yg)− λh + µh = 0
(h.3) −pxh + peh − gh = 0
(h.4) min {gh, µh} = 0
(M) −
PH
h=1 x
\
h − y\ +
PH
h=1 e
\
h = 0
(13)
Define
eΞ ≡ RC++ ×R++×R++ × ¡RC++ ×R++ ×R¢H × {g ∈ RH : HX
h=1
gh > 0} ×RC−1++
eξ ≡ ³y, α, yg, (xh, λh, µh)Hh=1 , g, p\´
and
F2 : eΞ×RCH++ → Rdim ?Ξ, F2 : ³eξ, e´ 7→ left hand side of system (13)
We can now prove that there is a large set of the endowments (the so-called
regular economies) for which associated equilibria are finite in number, and
that equilibria change smoothly with respect to endowments - see Theorem 17
below. To do this, we need to restrict the set of utility functions adding the
following assumptions
Assumption 3. ∀h, uh is diﬀerentiably strictly concave, i.e., ∀ (xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ , D2uh (xh)
is negative definite.
Assumption 4. For all h and (xh, yg) ∈ RC+1++
det
∙
Dxhxhuh (xh, y
g) [Dxhuh (xh, y
g)]T
Dygxhuh (xh, y
g) Dyguh (xh, yg)
¸
6= 0
Remark 15 In fact in the proof of regularity, we need that the following matrix
has full rank ∙
Dxhxh −pT
αDygxh −1
¸
in the case of household h being a contributor (and therefore µh = 0) in equilib-
rium, which is in fact implied by Assumption 4.
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The above assumption has an easy and appealing economic interpretation.
Let wh ∈ R++ denote the wealth of household h, and gh : RC++ × R+ → R+,¡
p\, wh, G\h
¢ 7→ gh ¡p\, wh, G\h¢ denote the private contribution function of
household h, i.e., part of the solution function to problem
max(xh,gh,ygh)∈RC++×R×R++ uh (xh, y
g
h) s.t. −pxh + wh − gh ≥ 0 λh
gh ≥ 0 µh
−ygh + bf ¡p, gh +G\h¢ ≥ 0 ηh
(14)
Lemma 16 Assumption 4 is equivalent to
for each
³
p\, wh, G\h
´
∈ RC++×R+ such that gh
³
p\, wh, G\h
´
> 0, Dwhgh
³
p\, wh,G\h
´
6= 0
Proof. The result follows from an application of the Implicit Function
Theorem to the first order conditions of the household maximization problem
(14).
To verify that the theorem can be applied we check that the Jacobian fM of
the left hand sides of the First Order Conditions of problem (14), with gh > 0,
has full rank. fM is displayed below.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Dxhxhuh Dxhyghuh −p
Dyghxhuh Dy
g
hy
g
h
uh −1
ηhDGG bf −1 DG bf
−pT −1 1
−1 DG bf
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
It is then enough to show that kerfM = {0}. Define e∆ ≡ (∆xh,∆ygh,∆gh,∆λh,∆ηh)Hh=1.
We first show that if (∆xh,∆y
g
h) = 0, then ∆ = 0. If (∆xh,∆y
g
h) 6= 0, then
(∆xh,∆y
g
h)D
2uh (xh, y
g
h) (∆xh,∆y
g
h) + (∆gh)
2 ηhDGG bf = 0, contradicting the
fact that D2uh is negative definite and
³
ηhDGG bf´ < 0.
We then compute Dwhgh as follows.
Dwh (xh, gh, y
g
h, λh, ηh) = −fM−1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
0
1
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
We can now use the following facts. Take An×n ≡
∙
A11 A12
A21 A22
¸
with A11a
square n1 dimensional matrix, A22 a square n2 dimensional matrix, n1+n2 = n.
1. If both A11 and C ≡ A22 − A21A−111 A12 are invertible, then it can be
easily checked that
A−1 ≡
∙
A−111
¡
I +A12C−1A21A
−1
11
¢
−A−111 A12C−1
−C−1A21A−111 C−1
¸
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2.
detA = detA11 det
£
A22 −A21A−111 A12
¤
= detA22 det
£
A11 −A12A−122 A21
¤
if A−111 or A
−1
22 exists, respectively - see 0.8.5, in Horn and Johnson (1985).
3. If An×n is negative definite and rank Cm×n = m, then CACT is negative
definite - see7.1.6, in Horn and Johnson (1985).
Using the above facts, we get
−Dwg =
³
Dygyguh −Dygxuh (Dxxuh)−1Dygxuh
´−1 α
λh
³
−Dygxuh (Dxxuh)−1Dxuh +Dyguh
´
and finally
det
∙
Dxxuh Dxuh
Dygxuh Dyguh
¸
= detDxxuh · detDyguh −Dygxuh (Dxxuh)−1Dxuh
as desired.
Call eU the subset of U whose elements satisfy Assumptions 3 and 4. Define
pr : F−12 (0)→ RCH++ , pr : (ξ, e) 7→ e
We can state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 17 For each (u, f) ∈ eU × F , there exists an open and full measure
subset R of RCH++ such that
1. there exists r ∈ N such that F−12,e (0) =
neξior
i=1
;
2. there exist an open neighborhood Y of e in RCH++ , and for each i an open
neighborhood Ui of
³eξi, e´ in F−12 (0) such that Uj ∩ Uk = ∅ if j 6= k,
pr−1 (Y ) = ∪ri=1Ui and pr|Ui : Ui → Y is a diﬀeomorphism.
A key ingredient in the proof of the above theorem is to show that zero is a
regular value for F2. An obvious immediate problem is that the min function
used in defining the equilibrium function F2 is not even diﬀerentiable when both
the constraint and the multiplier are equal to zero, which can be called a “border
line” case. We therefore show that border line cases occur outside an open and
full measure subset D∗ of the economy space.
Lemma 18 For each (u, f) ∈ eU × F , there exists an open and full measure
subset D∗ of RCH++ such that ∀e ∈ D∗ and ∀eξ such that F2 ³eξ, e´ = 0, it is the
case that
∀h ∈ H, either gh > 0 or µh > 0
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Proof. Define the set
C ≡
n³eξ, e´ ∈ F−12 (0) : ∃ h such that gh = µh = 0o
and observe that D∗ = RCH++ \pr (C). Since C is a closed set, openness of D∗
follows from properness of pr, which can be proven following the same arguments
contained in Lemma 12. The proof of full measure proceeds in three steps.
1. Let P be the family of all partitions of H into three subsets H1,H2 and
H3. In the equilibrium system 13, in place of min{gh, µh} = 0 substitute µh = 0
for h ∈ H1, gh = 0 for h ∈ H2, and gh = 0 and µh = 0 for h ∈ H3 (see the first
column of Table below for demonstration of how this is done).
2. Define
F2,H1,H2,H3 : Ξ× RCH++ → RdimΞ+#H3
which associates the left hand side of the equilibrium system (13) modified as
explained above to each
³eξ, e´ in the domain.
3. Define the set
BH1,H2,H3 ≡ {e ∈ RCH++ : ∃eξ such that F2,H1,H2,H3 ³eξ, e´ = 0}
and observe that7
D∗ ⊇ RCH++ \ ∪{H1,H2,H3}∈PBH1,H2,H3 (15)
That BH1,H2,H3 is of measure zero follows from the parametric transversality
theorem - see, for example, Hirsch (1976), Theorem 2.7, page 79 - and from the
fact that zero is a regular value for F2,H1,H2,H3 , which is shown below.
In the following Table, the components of F2,H1,H2,H3 are listed in the first
column, the variables with respect to which derivatives are taken are listed
in the first row, and in the remaining bottom right corner the corresponding
partial Jacobian of D(?ξ,e)F2,H1,H2,H3
³eξ, e´ is displayed. Call J that partial
Jacobian. Observe that in the Table below, h1 ∈ H3 and h3 ∈ H3, and zh ≡
xh − eh, z ≡
P
h zh, z
\ ≡ (zc)c6=C ; ∀h, Dhxhxh ≡ Dxhxhuh (xh, yg) ,Dhxhyg ≡
Dxhyguh (xh, y
g) ,Dhygxh ≡ Dygxhuh (xh, yg) ,Dhygyg ≡ Dygyguh (xh, yg). Note
also that, to simplify the exposition of the proof, only one household from each
7We cannot use the equality sign in (15), because BH1,H2,H3 contains economies e such
that FH1,H2,H3 (ξ, e) = 0 and for which some components gh and µh of ξ may be negative.
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set is presented in the Table.
y α x1 g1 λ1 µ1 x2 g2 λ2 µ2 yg e\1 e
C
1 e
\
2
eC2
Df(y)
−αp
(1)
D2f −pT
−py+
Σhgh
(2)
−p 1 1
Dx1u1+
−λ1p
(1.1)
D1x1x1
−pT D1
x1y
g
αDygu1
−λ1+µ1
(1.2)
D1
yg
αD1
ygx1
−1 1 αD1
ygyg
−pz1+
−g1
(1.3)
−p −1 p\ 1
µ1
(1.4) 1
Dx2u+
−λ2p
(2.1)
D2x2x2
−pT D2
x2y
g
αDygu2
−λ2+µ2
(2.2)
D2
yg
D2
ygx2
−1 1 αD2
ygyg
−pz2+
−g2
(2.3)
−p −1 p\ 1
g2
(2.4)
1
−x\−y\
+e
(M)
−I0 −I0 −I0 I I
−yg+f(y)
(3) Df(y)
−1
g1
(G) 1
To show that J has full rank, we can use elementary column operations. The
basic idea is to use a full row rank submatrix with zero in its supercolumn to
erase all the terms in its superrow. Below, we apply that method simply listing
a. the name of the row, and b. the submatrix used to “clean up” that row. Of
course, the order of those operations is crucial - even though there are diﬀerent
possibilities which work as well.
a. (1.3) (2.3) (M) (1.1),(1.2)
8
(1.4) (2.1),(2.2) (3) (1),(2) (2.4) (G
b. 1 1 I
∙
D1x1x1 −pT
αD1ygx1 −1
¸
1
∙
D2x2x2 0
D2ygx2 1
¸
−1
∙
D2f −pT
−p 0
¸
1 1
To prove Theorem 17 it is enough to follow the steps of the proof of Theorem
18, apart from that one related to the perturbation of the equation (G).
8We are using Assumption 4 and athe fact that µ1 = 0.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Subscription equilibrium mechanisms are perhaps the most decentralized and
market oriented mechanisms a society can consider for provision of public goods.
For the case where the public good is produced by a public (non-profit) firm, we
show in this paper that the subscription equilibrium mechanism has some de-
sirable consistency (i.e., existence of equilibria) and basic structural properties
(typical finiteness and “nice” dependence of endogenous variables from exoge-
nous variables). Those properties are a necessary first step in the direction of
analyzing other (more) interesting questions like the eﬀect of diﬀerent govern-
ment policies on the total amount of public good provided and on the welfare
of households at a subscription equilibrium with public production. We address
those questions in a companion paper (Villanacci and Zenginobuz, 2006).9
It is, of course, well known that in a large class of models, public good pro-
vision through voluntary subscriptions leads to levels of public good that are
lower than those associated with Pareto optima.10 The non-cooperative behav-
ior of households in determining their subscription levels leads to the infamous
free-rider problem. On the other hand, equilibrium notions that lead to Pareto
optimal outcomes in the presence of public goods suﬀer from the fact that they
are typically not implementable in the presence of asymmetric information about
preferences of households. For example, the Lindahl equilibrium notion, which
is an extension of the Walrasian equilibrium notion to public good economies,
involve personalized prices for households and their determination involve full
knowledge of household preferences by a central authority. The non-cooperative
subscription equilibrium notion, on the other hand, does not involve a central
authority. In future work we plan to allow for asymmetric information in a full-
fledged general equilibrium model with public goods and study the impact of
government interventions in such a setting. In that context, it will be appropri-
ate to model the economic policy institution as being managed by private agents
whose goals are not necessarily consistent with the benevolent purpose of Pareto
improving upon the existing situation, which will in turn require modelling the
behavior of the institution as part of a principal-agent model.
A model with public goods is clearly a particular case of large class of models
that involve more general externalities.11 Therefore, previous works on existence
of competitive equilibrium with externalities in consumption and production
relate to the model we study here, but, as we illustrate below, our existence
result is novel.
9See Villanacci and Zenginobuz (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) for studies on the impact
of goverment intervention on subscription equilibrium outcomes in the case where the public
good is produced by competitive firms.
10 See, for example, Cornes and Sandler (1985).
11A standard definition of externalities is the following one “An externality is present when-
ever some economic agent’s welfare (utility or profit) includes real variables whose values are
chosen by others without particular attention to the eﬀect upon the welfare of the other agents
they aﬀect.” (Myles (1995), page 313.) A model with private provision of public good is then
a particular model with externalities: each household voluntary contribution influences the
amount of public good produced and therefore other households utility levels.
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McKenzie (1955) studies a model of externalities with production, but he
considers a linear production technology. Arrow and Hahn (1971) allow for
decreasing returns to scale in production, but they postulate the existence of
a consumption vector whose utility is independent of other agents’ choices, an
assumption which fails to hold in our model. Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975)
show the existence of competitive equilibria in a pure exchange framework,
hence their results do not apply to our model which incorporates production.
Moreover, the definition of equilibrium by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) is
problematic due to the way they treat the (artificial) distinction between an
household’s actual consumption and her intended consumption (see pages 84
and 85)12.
Florenzano (2003) presents a proof of existence for a general equilibrium
model with externalities and production under quite general assumptions13 .
The main diﬀerence between Florenzano’s set-up and the one in this paper is
that in our case firms do not behave competitively. In fact, in our model, there is
only one firm which maximizes the level of production under a balanced budget
constraint. Moreover, not only consumer preferences depend upon other house-
holds’ decisions and production, but, by very definition of the firm problem,
production choices depend upon consumers’ choices14 , a feature of the model
which is not encompassed by Florenzano’s framework.15
12Arrow and Hahn (1971) themselves are aware of that problem and discuss it - see page
132.
13To the best of our knowledge, Florenzano’s book presents the most general results on the
topic.
14The constraint set of the firm - see problem 1 - is determined by households’ subscriptions.
15The present model could be reinterpreted as one in which there is a particular kind of
consumer (the public firm) which maximizes her utility under a budget constraint. But in
that case another modelling assumption in Florenzano’s framework, namely the fact that the
consumers’ budget sets do not depend upon other consumers’ choices, will be violated.
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